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The Economic Partnership Agreement between Uganda and the EU: 
Trade and Poverty Impacts 




This paper analyses the poverty impacts of an economic partnership agreement 
(EPA) between Uganda and the EU. As Ugandan exports are also eligible for duty-
free access to the EU under the Everything But Arms scheme the main EPA-
induced change will be the requirement to liberalise EU exporters' access to the 
Ugandan market. Fears have been raised that this could threaten the livelihoods of 
poor people through lower prices for agricultural commodities, crowding out of 
vulnerable industries, and loss of government revenue. In an attempt to address 
these concerns, we assess the impact potential of an EPA using descriptive 
statistics of Ugandan trade, social accounting matrix, and household budget survey 
data. Subsequently, we quantify the impacts on the economy and poverty, in 
particular, by conducting a simulation study based on a combined CGE-
microsimulation model. The descriptive analysis suggests very limited scope for 
trade liberalisation with the EU and that the poor, in particular, have only weak 
links to formal markets. The results from the simulation of alternative EPA 
scenarios show minor but positive macroeconomic impacts indicating potentially 
low economic adjustment costs. Whether the very small poverty effects emerge 
positive or not depends on the selection of sensitive products in the EPA. 




During the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations with the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries a range of fears were raised about the possible 
adverse effects on their economies (see, e.g., Bilal and Rampa, 2006; Delpeuch, 2007; 
Oxfam, 2006). These included the possible welfare-reducing effects of trade diversion 
from more efficient third country suppliers to EU exporters, the possibility that more 
competitive EU imports would undermine local industry and lead to a process of de-
industrialization, the impact of competition from subsidised EU food production on 
domestic food security, the potential impact of the loss of tariff revenue on EU imports 
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for the provision of government services and, in general, the risk that these agreements 
would exacerbate rather than reduce overall poverty levels. Recent literature has used a 
variety of modeling approaches to examine these concerns, without any overall 
consensus emerging (see ODI (2006) and the references cited therein).  
 
This chapter addresses these concerns for the case of Uganda. We intend to analyze the 
poverty impact of the trade provisions of a full EPA between the EU and the East 
African Community (EAC) of which Uganda is a member. In the interim EPA signed in 
December 2007, the EU and the EAC agreed to establish a free trade area. For such a 
free trade area to be compatible with WTO rules, GATT Art. XXIV requires that 
“substantially all trade” between the constituent territories must be liberalized. The 
European Commission interprets this phrase to mean that 90% of the bilateral trade 
value must be liberalized where the liberalization can occur asymmetrically.
1 As under 
the interim EPA the EU will abolish 100% of its tariffs on EAC imports (with 
transitional periods for rice and sugar), the EAC has to liberalize 82.1% of its imports.
2 
The EAC’s tariffs on EU imports will be phased out gradually in three tranches starting 
in 2010 and completed in 2033; the first non-zero tariffs will be eliminated in 2015. The 
ultimate list of those sensitive tariff lines which will be exempt from liberalization at the 
conclusion of the transition period is not yet known. Stevens et al. (2008), in analyzing 
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the interim EPA, find that 593 tariff lines (Harmonized System) where Uganda had 
actual imports – corresponding to 42.9% of Ugandan import value from the EU – are not 
listed in the interim EPA, either for liberalization or exemption. Hence, the agreement is 
rather preliminary at this stage.  
 
In the absence of an elaborated EAC tariff liberalization schedule, we have constructed 
three alternative scenarios for such possible schedules, reflecting different priorities for 
the Ugandan negotiators. In each scenario sufficient tariff lines are exempted from 
liberalization to account for 17.9% of initial EU imports. We use the nominal 2006 
revenue from each tariff line as a reflection of the sensitivity the government has 
attached to the product in the past. The EPA-EAC scenario optimizes the list of sensitive 
products with respect to overall EAC interests, i.e., the tariff revenue for the EAC as a 
whole is maximized; the EPA-UGA scenario gives higher weight to Uganda’s interests; 
and finally the EPA-AG scenario prioritizes the protection of Uganda’s agricultural 
sectors. We examine the likely impact of each scenario on the poverty headcount, and 
the depth and severity of poverty, in Uganda. 
 
Uganda as an LDC has enjoyed duty-free access to the EU markets under the EU’s 
Cotonou Agreement until its cessation and replacement through EPAs but since 2001 
also under the Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme which remains in place indefinitely.
3 
We thus simplify the analysis of measuring the poverty impacts of the EPA’s trade 
provisions by examining solely the requirement that Uganda as an EAC member reduces 
over time its tariffs on EU imports.
4 We perform our simulations using a combined 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) - microsimulation model which enables the 
quantification of the adjustment impacts on the economy following EPA liberalization 
and the impacts on overall poverty. The Uganda CGE model is a static, non-monetary 
model based on a 1999 Uganda social accounting matrix (SAM). The SAM has been 
updated to better match the factor income shares as observed in the household survey. A 
pre-experiment generates a synthetic SAM for 2006 which takes the 2006 import tariffs 
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into account, in particular, Uganda’s implementation of the EAC custom union’s 
common external tariff (CET) and internal tariff elimination. Starting from this synthetic 
baseline SAM, the CGE model provides the post-simulation factor returns and 
commodity prices for the microsimulation that follows in a second step. The 
microsimulation projects these figures on to a detailed household income distribution 
derived from the 2002/2003 Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS) generating a 
counterfactual income distribution for poverty analysis.  
 
While recognizing the limitations of the model used in this chapter, we conclude that the 
introduction of the trade provisions of an EPA between Uganda and the EU would have 
a very small poverty effect which may be positive or not depending on the list of 
sensitive products exempt from liberalization. The small magnitude of the impacts is 
driven, in part, by the relatively low share of the EU in current Ugandan imports and the 
relatively low average tariff which these imports currently face. Much of the effect 
would be due to a relative shift of resources out of import-competing sectors and into 
coffee production. But despite the possibility of reducing the poverty headcount, the 
very poorest would lose income in all of our EPA scenarios. It is important to underline 
that these are comparative static results, and that these effects in practice would play out 
over an extended 25-year time scale in which the nature of the Ugandan economy will 
undergo substantial change which will likely dwarf the poverty impacts which we 
identify. 
 
We develop this argument in the following sections. Section 2 uses trade, household 
survey, and social accounting matrix data to provide an initial intuitive feel for the likely 
poverty impact potential of trade liberalization under the EPA. Section 3 describes the 
data and the combined CGE-microsimulation model used for the analysis. The 
quantitative results from the formal modeling are set out in Section 4, while Section 5 
presents our conclusions.  
 
2 The poverty impact potential of EPA trade liberalization 
 
In this section we examine data on existing trade relations between Uganda and the EU 
as well as data on the structure of Ugandan economic activity and household survey data 
to obtain an impression of the magnitude of the trade shock and its impact potential for   5




McCulloch et al. (2001) identify three main channels via which trade liberalization 
reform might translate into poverty impacts: the consumption, the enterprise, and the 
government channels. Import tariff liberalization reforms initially affect the prices of the 
imported commodities and their substitutes on the domestic market. As consumers, 
individuals are affected by changes in consumption goods’ prices which change the 
purchasing power of their incomes (the consumption channel). As producers, their 
profits directly depend on prices for inputs and outputs, or, as workers, price changes 
affect enterprise profits and thus factor demand which materializes in employment and 
wage changes (the enterprise channel). As citizens, people are affected if tariff revenue 
loss induces changes in government policies regarding direct transfers, taxes, and 
provision of public goods and social services (the government channel). Apart from 
these immediate, static, monetary impacts, trade liberalization might also affect peoples’ 
livelihoods in indirect and dynamic ways, for instance, by increasing incentives for 
investment and innovation and thus economic growth as well as by altering the 
vulnerability of the economy and households to negative external shocks, e.g., by 
encouraging specialization in a small number of goods.
6 Nevertheless, in the following 
we look only at the impact potential of the three static channels.  
 
The reduction of Uganda’s import tariffs will be associated with a reduction in domestic 
prices due to the availability of cheaper imported substitutes. The magnitude of the 
direct price effect of import liberalization depends on the size of existing import trade 
barriers, the size of the tariff cuts, and the substitutability of imported with domestic 
goods. In an extended view, it also depends on how much the specific tariff lines are 
decreased relative to each other and on the general equilibrium effects working through 
the entire economy. How these effects translate into real income effects for each 
individual depends initially on the composition of their expenditure and income sources.  
 
Through which import sectors will the EPA affect the economy? Uganda is strongly 
import dependent with imports amounting to 29% of Uganda’s GDP but exports only to 
12% (1999 SAM). As illustrated in Table 1 based on 2006 import value and tariff data, 
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the EU’s share in Uganda’s global imports amounts to 19%. 96% of EU imports are 
concentrated in the three sectors: manufacturing, petroleum and chemicals, and other 
agriculture (this table only shows those sectors in which imports take place; the full list 
of sectors used in the SAM is shown in Table 2). Imports of manufactures are by far the 
main imports from the EU yet they account for only 13% of total manufacturing imports 
to Uganda. While the EU import share is high for some agricultural products, their 
import volumes are insignificant. The overall trade-weighted import tariff for the EU is 
just 5.5%. Within the three main import sectors, there is a moderately high tariff of 6% 
on manufacturing but only a 2% tariff on petroleum and chemicals, and the tariff on 
other agriculture is negligible. Thus, assuming imperfect substitutability between 
imported and domestic goods, only in the manufacturing sector do we expect substantial 
initial impacts of the EPA in the form of a drop in prices.  
 
Table 1: Importance of the EU as a source of imports for Uganda, 2006 
  Value of global
imports





faced by EU 
imports
 UGS  million % % %
Coffee   2 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other Cash Crops   66 0.00 0.00 24.88
Maize   8,061 0.17 0.04 50.00
Sorghum/Millet   26,207 0.56 0.09 25.00
Horticulture   15,717 0.34 0.08 25.00
Other agriculture   214,533 4.59 1.19 0.07
Livestock   816 0.02 0.01 12.54
Forestry   1,342 0.03 0.00 0.22
Fishing   93 0.00 0.00 12.25
Meat and dairy processing   8,297 0.18 0.02 46.92
Coffee processing   1,726 0.04 0.00 14.05
Grain milling   37,828 0.81 0.05 12.62
Other beverages   43,024 0.92 0.24 15.00
Textiles and leather   212,933 4.55 0.11 20.13
Manufacturing   2,500,612 53.49 13.24 6.22
Fertilizers   22,582 0.48 0.05 0.00
Petroleum and chemicals   1,572,419 33.63 3.72 1.95
Utilities   8,187 0.18 0.00 –
Private services   535 0.01 0.00 11.78
Total/Weighted average  4,674,979 100.00 18.86 5.48
Source: Own calculations based on 2006 SAM; tariff data based on own computations from UNCTAD 
Trains data for 2006.  
 
What are the expected effects on domestic sectors? Table 2 shows the structure of 
domestic industry and trade based on the 1999 Uganda SAM. Uganda’s production   7
activity is strongly concentrated in the agricultural sector, generating 46% of Uganda’s 
value added, followed by the services (35%) and industrial (19%) sectors. The 
manufacturing and petroleum and chemicals sectors account for only 5% and 1% of 
output, respectively. 75% of domestic demand for manufactures is satisfied through 
imports while at the same time manufacturing accounts for 23% of Uganda’s exports. 
This hints at complementarities rather than competition between imports and domestic 
production of manufacturing goods. The petroleum and chemicals sector is small and 
domestic demand is largely satisfied by imports. 
 


































 %% % % % % % %
Coffee   2.56 3.06 – – 0.00 0.00 6.60 –
Other Cash Crops   1.28 1.30 – – 0.00 0.00 6.60 0.02
Maize   1.94 2.86 0.87 3.02 – – – –
Sorghum/Millet   2.36 3.48 – – – – – –
Cassava   1.81 2.67 – – – – – –
Sweet potatoes   1.73 2.55 – – – – – –
Matooke   4.35 6.41 – – – – – –
Horticulture   4.68 6.89 1.21 1.72 – – – –
Other agriculture   3.75 5.52 2.09 4.12 0.84 0.31 6.58 6.52
Livestock   5.03 7.34 – – 0.13 0.05 6.60 0.54
Forestry   1.35 1.51 – – 0.02 0.01 6.60 0.36
Fishing   1.73 2.20 4.11 15.87 0.01 0.01 6.60 0.22
Meat and dairy processing   0.93 0.42 – – 2.24 0.82 6.58 33.99
Coffee processing   3.13 0.33 41.92 98.43 0.00 0.00 6.60 1.89
Grain milling   0.59 0.26 – – 0.67 0.25 6.60 18.76
Other beverages   8.38 4.73 8.36 6.86 1.85 0.68 6.58 4.24
Textiles and leather   0.94 0.59 0.46 3.33 9.22 3.39 6.58 67.92
Manufacturing   4.75 3.22 15.75 23.36 48.39 38.48 14.24 74.90
Fertilizers   – – – – 1.37 0.52 6.84 100.00
Petroleum and chemicals   1.00 0.44 – – 20.07 49.94 44.54 84.20
Utilities   1.05 1.31 1.81 14.46 0.18 0.07 6.60 4.04
Construction   10.52 8.00 – – 0.17 0.06 6.61 0.34
Commerce   10.60 12.24 – – 0.69 0.25 6.58 1.36
Transport   7.56 4.95 8.31 9.16 6.73 2.46 6.54 17.18
Private services   12.32 13.94 15.12 10.23 7.41 2.71 6.55 12.60
Public services   5.66 3.79 – – – – – –
Total or weighted average   100.00 100.00 100.00 8.34 100.00 100.00 17.90 15.70
Source: Own computation from the 1999 Uganda SAM. 
 
On the export side, by far the most important commodity is processed coffee with 42% 
of total exports, followed by manufacturing and private services. The agricultural and 
food processing sectors in total comprise 59% of total exports. 98% of processed coffee   8
output is exported. This indicates a strong dependency on coffee exports and the 
agriculture and food processing sector in general.  
 
Looking at the entirety of Uganda’s imports, these are dominated by manufacturing 
commodities accounting for 48% of total imports, followed by petroleum and chemicals 
20%, and textiles and leather 9%.
7 Agricultural commodities play a minor role in 
imports. The very low import significance and an average import tariff rate of 6.6%
8 
indicate that liberalization of agricultural trade will have only a small impact on the 
economy. In contrast, imports in the industrial sectors are relatively important and tariff 
rates average 20%.
9 In these sectors, liberalization is expected to impact relatively 
strongly on domestic prices. The same applies to a lesser degree to the services sector 
which has an average tariff of 6.5%.  
 
Revenue from import tariffs accounts for a large share, 31.5%, of total government 
revenue and is thus a very important income source for the government.
10 Imports of 
manufactures and petroleum and chemicals provide the bulk of import tariff revenue. 
The loss of tariff revenue will require the government to introduce offsetting measures 
either reducing government transfers or public services or raising some alternative tax 
rates. Some tariffs can easily be replaced by excise taxes in a revenue-neutral manner as 
the Ugandan government has done with petroleum tariffs. Other revenue-raising 
measures will obviously directly affect individual welfare. Unfortunately, the household 
budget survey we use includes no data about income from government transfers or the 
value of public services provided by the government and thus we can only partially 
evaluate the impacts of shocks working through the government channel. 
  
The preceding discussion touches qualitatively on the potential impacts of trade 
liberalization under an EPA on Uganda’s economy but leaves open the question how 
this will impact on poverty. In order to explore this question, we need to assess the 
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impact on individuals’ real incomes and therefore turn to the 2002/2003 household 
budget survey data (UNHS).  
 
Looking at the (imputed) income sources of households in the UNHS, most income for 
the poorest deciles comes from unskilled labour (65% for the very poorest decile) and 
some from transfers and land. With increasing per capita income, unskilled labour and 
transfer incomes decrease steadily in importance while skilled labour and capital returns 
increase in importance in total income so that the latter two become the main income 
sources for the richest deciles. Reliance on land returns is largest amongst the middle per 
capita income deciles. But although the poorer deciles draw most of their incomes from 
unskilled labour it does not mean that higher returns to unskilled labour will mainly 
benefit the poor. Figure 1 describes the distribution of factor rewards across the 
population in the fashion of Lorenz curves. The Lorenz curve compares the cumulative 
share of each factor or income source with the cumulative share of the population. Only 
about 30% of the returns to unskilled labour accrue to the lower half of the income 
distribution. Land returns benefit poor people to an even smaller extent. But returns to 
capital and skilled labour are the most unequally distributed since the richest 10 to 20% 
reap 85 to 90% of the total returns.  
   10
Figure 1: Lorenz curve and factor ownership distribution 

















































Source: Own computation from the imputed household incomes.  
 
Figure 2 shows the average share of each observed income source in total household 
income for each per capita income decile. While wages are negligible as a source of 
income for the poorest population decile, accounting for only 6% of its total income, its 
share increases disproportionately over the deciles until it accounts for 76% of the 
income of the richest decile.
11 The share of free consumption consisting, for example, of 
transfers from other households, the government, or abroad, is rather constant around 
21% with a peak in the lowest decile and a low point in the highest decile. Crop farming 
provides a roughly constant share of about 17% in income for the poorest eight deciles 
and then drops for the richest two. Autoconsumption, meaning subsistence farming and 
the consumption of own produce, amounts to a fairly constant share of about 50% for 
the first six deciles and then drops at an increasing rate to account for only 8% of the 
incomes of the richest decile. There is a strong shift in the importance of income sources 
from autoconsumption (or subsistence farming) to wage incomes in moving from the 
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poorest to the richest deciles. The poorest decile draws 79% of their income from auto- 
and free consumption, while the richest decile earns 76% of its income from wage 
employment alone.  
 
Consequently, in the lower income deciles we expect little direct effect on income from 
wage level changes as most of their income derives from free and autoconsumption. On 
the other side, there might well occur a strong indirect effect from the restructuring of 
the economy as rising wages draw more people into wage employment. Since 
subsistence farming is independent of market prices, it will not experience any direct 
price effects. But there will be direct price effects on incomes from crop farming and 
transfers of free goods.  
 
Figure 2: Sources of observed income as shares of total income by per capita 






























































Income Decile  
Source: Own computation from the UNHS. 
 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the population across income deciles by their affinity 
to rural areas and agriculture. 86% of the population live in rural areas and only 14% in 
urban areas. 64% are directly connected to agriculture and another 26%, the rural non-
agricultural population, are likely to have a strong indirect dependency on the 
agricultural sector. But the distribution changes drastically with increasing per capita 
income. While virtually all people in the lowest decile live in rural areas (98%) and 88%   12
are directly associated with agriculture, the latter decreases over the deciles to only 28% 
in the richest decile. Similarly, the share of people living in urban areas increases from 
2% in the poorest to 50% in the richest decile.
12 Furthermore, the importance of agrarian 
occupations declines rather strongly with rising income to account for only 28% of the 
richest decile. This highlights the dependency of the poorer households in particular but 
also of the Ugandan economy in general on the agricultural sector. Therefore, trade 
liberalization impacts on the agricultural sector are likely to affect largely and especially 
the poorer population.  
 
Figure 3: Households by their affinity to rural areas and agriculture across per 






























































































Income Decile  
Source: Own computation from the UNHS. Affinity to agriculture is classified by the usual industry of 
occupation of the household head. 
 
Figure 4 explores the usual employment status of the labour force by per capita income 
decile. 60% of the entire labour force is engaged in subsistence farming. The share of 
subsistence farmers in each decile is rapidly decreasing from 83% in the poorest to 18% 
in the richest decile. The share of people in subsistence farming shifts strongly towards 
self-employment (from 9% to 38%) and paid employment (from 4% to 33%) with 
increasing income. Unemployment is on a relatively low level of 3% on average with an 
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taken into account.   13
increasing trend towards the richer deciles.
13 Likewise, the share of the inactive 
population, i.e., individuals unemployed and not actively searching for work, is 2% on 
average and exhibits a slightly increasing trend towards richer deciles.
14  
 
Figure 4: Labour force shares by employment status and per capita household 








































































Income Decile  
Source: Own computation from the UNHS. 
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family members are likely to be “underemployed” rather than unemployed. 
14 The inactive labour force includes in particular students and individuals, especially women, engaged in 
domestic duties.   14
The high shares of subsistence farmers and self-employed workers and the low share of 
paid workers in the poorer deciles point out once more that wage level changes will have 
little direct impact on poverty. However, trade liberalization might increase the demand 
for wage work and thereby increase wages and draw additional workers into paid 
employment. The theory of dual economies explains that this does not necessarily lead 
to any output loss in the subsistence or self-employment sectors as there might exist a 
considerable level of underemployment in the informal sector.
15 If so, increased work 
effort of the remaining workers can at least partly make up for the withdrawn 
manpower. Thus, if the additional wage income for the household comes without loss of 
income from subsistence farming such a shift might mean a dramatic income 
improvement for the household. However, we do not explicitly model this possibility in 
the simulations in this chapter.  
 
Table 3 decomposes the active labour force using top level International Standard 
Industrial Classification (ISIC) codes, ordered by share in the total active labour force.
16 
With 66%, the largest part of the labour force is absorbed by the agricultural sector (A). 
Another 11% work in the wholesale trade and repair services sector (G), but only 6% in 
manufacturing. The remaining 17% are spread across sectors with shares of less than 3% 
though most can be attributed to the services sector. This again emphasizes the 
predominance of the agricultural sector in the Ugandan economy and establishes the 
private services sector as the second largest sector in terms of labour force shares 
employed. Manufacturing is of lesser importance. Moreover, the manufacturing sector in 
Uganda also largely consists of the processing of agricultural goods.  
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http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=17 on 10 September 2007.   15
Table 3: Division of the active labour force by ISIC categories for industry of 
occupation  
ISIC   %   Description  
A   65.52 Agriculture, hunting and forestry  
G    11.33 Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and
personal and household goods  
D   5.82  Manufacturing  
M   2.82  Education  
Z   2.78  Unknown  
H   2.37  Hotels and restaurants  
I   1.96  Transport, storage and communications  
O   1.81  Other community, social and personal service activities  
F   1.29  Construction  
L   0.92  Public administration and defence; compulsory social security  
N   0.85  Health and social work  
B   0.85  Fishing  
P    0.84 Activities of private households as employers and undifferentiated 
production activities of private households  
K   0.41  Real estate, renting and business activities  
C   0.26  Mining and quarrying  
E   0.07  Electricity, gas and water supply  
Q   0.05  Extraterritorial organizations and bodies  
J   0.05  Financial intermediation  
Source: Own computation from the UNHS data. 
 
Having looked at the income sources we now turn to the expenditure side which 
determines the real purchasing power of the income for each household. Figure 5 shows 
the household expenditure shares that each income decile spends on different 
commodity groups. In line with Engel’s Law, the share of food in household expenditure 
shrinks with increasing per capita income.
17 This trend is consistent for staple food items 
like cassava, sorghum, maize, and sweet potatoes but more heterogenous in the other 
foods group where expenditure shares on higher value foods like meat, fish, or matooke 
increase first but drop off for the richest deciles. A continuous and increasing upward 
trend is observable for expenditures for services. Richer households also spend more on 
the “Others” category, which in particular comprises transfers and gifts. Thus, when 
looking at the development of prices and purchasing power after trade liberalization, 
especially agricultural and processed food commodity prices have a big impact on the 
poorer deciles while the richer ones are relatively more affected by prices of 
manufacturing goods and services.  
 
                                                 
17 See for example Deaton (1997, p. 25).   16
Figure 5: Expenditure shares by commodity group and per capita household 



























































Income Decile  
Source: Own computation from the UNHS. Nf.manuf. denotes non-food manufacturing commodities. 
 
This discussion of data has explored how EPA trade liberalization might affect the 
Ugandan economy and different population groups within the economy. The analysis 
illustrates that the EU’s exports to Uganda currently face only low tariffs and that 
Uganda’s tariff elimination will have a significant impact only in the non-food 
manufacturing and petroleum and chemicals sectors given that, in other sectors, either 
imports are insignificant, the EU’s share in imports is low or the Ugandan tariff is very 
low. The impact on the poorer deciles will be strongly related to the development in 
food prices in both their capacities as consumers and as producers and the development 
of the agricultural sector in general, although any impact will be dampened by the large 
share of subsistence farmers among the poor. It is clear that there is a multitude of 
offsetting effects making it impossible a priori to predict even the direction of impact on 
the poor population. We thus turn to describe how we quantified the likely poverty 
impact of the EPA with the help of simulation methods.  
 
3 The combined CGE-microsimulation model 
 
The data discussion in Section 2 gives rise to very limited expected direct impacts of the 
EPA on the sectors important to the Ugandan poor. Additionally, the poor appear to   17
have only weak links to the main traded sectors and formal markets in general. But a 
large part of the effect on poverty might occur indirectly through changes in unskilled 
labour wages and in prices. Moreover, tariff reform causes a loss in government revenue 
which needs to be replaced by other tax instruments. Capturing these effects calls for a 
general equilibrium model that accounts for the reverberation of the effects of the tariff 
changes through all economic sectors and quantifies the various counteracting effects. 
But drawing conclusions on poverty effects also requires detailed information about 
income distribution effects which are not readily provided by standard CGE models. For 
this reason, the CGE model is combined with a microsimulation model which simulates 
the consequences of the CGE-simulated outcomes on the income distribution and allows 
us to draw inferences about the likely effects on poverty.  
 
The CGE model we construct utilizes a 1999 Uganda SAM based on one originally 
constructed by Dorosh and El-Said (2004). The SAM comprises accounts for 26 
commodities, 25 activities, 4 factors of production including both skilled and unskilled 
labour, 1 household as well as government and the rest of the world. In contrast to the 
SAM of Dorosh and El-Said (2004), we aggregated all domestic zones into a single zone 
and their four household types into a single household. We adjusted the payments to 
labour by skill level to match those observed in the household survey. Land is assumed 
agriculture-specific and capital is specific to non-agricultural sectors. The SAM takes 
account of household autoconsumption which is reflected as payments from the 
household directly to the activities instead of to the commodity accounts.
18,19  
 
In 2005, Uganda as a member of the EAC implemented the EAC’s common external 
tariff (CET) on imports from third countries.
20 Thus, starting from the 1999 Uganda 
SAM, we create a synthetic baseline scenario by simulating the changes in the Ugandan 
economy arising from the implementation of the EAC customs union and the common 
tariff structure using the 2006 EAC import tariffs and abolishing all tariffs on imports 
                                                 
18 The 1999 SAM has been inflated using a GDP deflator (Source: World Bank. Series Name “GDP 
deflator (base year varies by country)”, World Development Indicators (WDI) Online, retrieved on 20 
February 2008) to be compatible with the numbers of the household survey base year 2002/2003. 
19 The economic structure reflected in the 1999 SAM is shown in Table 2. 
20 Roughly, the CET applies a three band import tariff structure with 0% on raw materials, 10% on 
intermediate products, and 25% on finished products complemented with a list of sensitive products for 
which the tariffs are higher than 25%.   18
from EAC members.
21 The tariffs used are most favored nation (MFN) applied tariffs or 
preferential tariffs, whichever are lower, as of 2006 and aggregated to SAM industries 
using trade weighting.
22 Additionally, we substitute an ad valorem sales tax on the Petrol 
and Chemicals sector to avoid the drop of import tariffs in this formerly heavily 
protected sector becoming the dominating effect in the pre-experiment. Uganda 
introduced a high excise duty on gasoline, diesel, and illuminating kerosene in 2005.
23  
 
The CGE model is based on the IFPRI Standard Computable General Equilibrium 
Model in GAMS (Löfgren et al., 2002). The model is a static, non-monetary, single-
country model where all representative agents optimize – rationally and fully informed – 
their individual benefits resulting in a market-cleared, no-profit equilibrium. Factors are 
assumed to be fully mobile for all factor markets. For a detailed description and 
mathematical formulation of the model see Löfgren et al. (2002). Further details on the 
calibration of the model and the specific closure rules used can be found in Boysen and 
Matthews (2008). 
 
The microsimulation is based on the Uganda National Household Survey 2002/03
24 
(UNHS). The UNHS consists of socio-economic, labour force, informal enterprise, and 
community questionnaire modules. The representative sample includes 9,711 
households corresponding to 52,088 individuals. The sample coverage of the population 
is stated to be 97%. The sample data was cleaned and adjusted and values were imputed 
where necessary to get a usable and complete dataset. For details on these adjustments 
and imputations, see Boysen and Matthews (2008). 
 
The microsimulation model is a non-behavioral microaccounting model which simulates 
the first-order effects of changes in commodity prices and factor returns given by the 
CGE model on household incomes based on the representative household sample 
collected in the UNHS. No reactions to price changes are assumed on the household side 
thus the simulation reflects explicitly the short-term implications on the income 
                                                 
21 Kenyan imports to Tanzania and Uganda will be liberalized from 2010. 
22 UNCTAD Trains database, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, 
Switzerland. Accessed online via WITS, World Bank on 30 June 2008. The tariff rate selected is the 
“effectively applied rate”. 
23 Excise Tariff (Amendment) Act, 2005, Uganda. 
24 Uganda Bureau of Statistics, Entebbe, Uganda, 2003.   19
distribution. The simulation takes into account the heterogeneity of households’ income 
source compositions by accounting for their respective factor endowments and specific 
individual wages by skill levels. In order to account for changes on the expenditure side, 
nominal household income is divided by the household-specific CPI to yield real 
income. This implies that all wages of the same skill level change proportionally and 
that households do not react to the changes in their economic situation thus leaving their 
income source composition unchanged and not substituting consumption items. The 
neglect of any adaptive behavior represents a worst-case scenario for the household but 
is not far-fetched as a short-run scenario for the poorest people since they usually also 
lack resources and options to react quickly and comprehensively to economic changes, 
particularly on the income side.
25  
 
We measure poverty in terms of absolute poverty employing the Pα measures introduced 
by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984).
26 We use rural and urban poverty lines which 
have been recovered from the adjusted household survey data so that the poverty 
headcounts reported in the UNHS Report on the Socio-Economic Survey (UBoS, 2003, 
Table 6.3.2 (a)) are reproduced. In particular, we find poverty lines of 192,707 UGS and 
218,516 UGS for the 41.7% of rural and 12.2% of urban poverty headcounts, 
respectively. The UBoS poverty lines are based on the cost of basic needs approach, 
which accounts for the cost of meeting physical calorie needs and allows for vital non-
food expenditure, as for instance clothing and cooking fuels, valued using the average 
consumption basket of the poorest 50% of the population
.27 The rural and urban poverty 
lines account for the differences in prices and consumption baskets for the respective 
subpopulations. As the income measure we use per capita income.  
 
                                                 
25 Taking advantage of new opportunities might require for instance training, new seeds or machinery but 
necessary credit is often unavailable for the poorest. 
26 Setting the parameter α in the following formula to 0, 1, or 2 computes the poverty headcount, gap, or 
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⎩ ,  N: population 
size, z: poverty line, and yi: income of individual i. 
27 See UBoS (2003, Appendix II(A), 2).   20
4 The poverty impacts of the Uganda Economic Partnership Agreement 
 
4.1 The Baseline 
 
Since the Uganda SAM used is from 1999, we conduct a pre-experiment to simulate the 
impacts of Uganda’s implementation of the EAC customs union in 2005 including the 
adoption of the CET and the removal of the EAC market’s internal tariffs. The tariff 
patterns before and after the EAC CET implementation are rather different. Many 
sectors experience strong import tariff hikes where Uganda previously had low tariffs 
and many others are cut drastically. But overall, the trade-weighted average tariff for 
Uganda drops by almost 11 percentage points. To a large extent, this is due to tariff cuts 
in the main import sectors, manufacturing, and petrol and chemicals. But Uganda has 
replaced the petroleum tariff by a per unit excise duty which we take into account in the 
pre-experiment and the counterfactual scenarios by introducing an ad valorem 
equivalent sales tax on petroleum and chemicals. The results of this pre-experiment form 
the starting point for the EPA scenarios and are shown in the EAC column in the tables 
in this section. Because we have only one Rest-of-World account, we do not explicitly 
take account of changes in the source composition of imports in this baseline update 
scenario in response to the change in relative tariffs. Thus, to the extent that the creation 
of the EAC leads to trade diversion from EU to EAC import sources, we over-estimate 
the extent to which Uganda’s overall imports would require to be liberalized as a 
consequence of the EPA. 
 
4.2 Scenarios 
As detailed in the Introduction, our scenarios assume that the EAC has to liberalize 
82.1% of imports from the EU so that 17.9% can be exempted in the list of sensitive 
products. Taking the 2006 tariff revenue of each line as an indicator of the line’s 
sensitivity, we optimize the list of sensitive products according to different interest 
priorities. The EPA-EAC scenario assumes that the EAC as a whole tries to retain as 
much tariff revenue as possible and selects exempted tariff lines up to a maximum of 
17.9% of 2006 EU imports accordingly. The next two scenarios give more weight to 
Ugandan interests. In the EPA-UGA scenario, Uganda optimizes the tariff schedule with 
respect to sensitive products to minimize its own tariff revenue loss. In the EPA-AG 
scenario, Uganda’s first priority is to protect its agricultural sector and then to minimize 
tariff revenue loss from the remaining sectors. This means that we first exempt all   21
agricultural tariff lines and then the non-agricultural tariff lines. In contrast to the long 
phase-out period set down in the interim EPA, for our comparative-static model we 
assume a simultaneous implementation of the schedule, as it will be realized in 2033. 
Note again that our use of a single Rest-of-World account means that all imports are 
treated as a single aggregate in terms of source. We thus do not take account of the 
possibility that the EPA would lead to trade diversion away from imports from EAC 
partners and non-EU exporters generally in favour of EU imports. The welfare effects of 
this trade diversion are ambiguous because EU imports would displace higher-cost EAC 
imports but lower-cost imports from non-EAC non-EU exporters. It should be also noted 
that the EU-EAC EPA negotiation is not a stand-alone process but part of a series of 
EPA negotiations between the EU and ACP country groups including the neighbouring 
Southern African Development Community (SADC EPA states incl. Botswana, Lesotho, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland) and Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA incl. 
Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Zambia, Zimbabwe). These other EPAs 
could divert trade away from the EAC and disadvantage Uganda in a way not captured 
in our model. 
 
Table 4 details the number of tariff lines affected and the tariff revenue loss 
corresponding to each scenario. For example, in the EPA-UGA scenario, Uganda 
imports under 2542 tariff lines of the 5224 lines of the Harmonized System. It selects 
1068 lines for exemption to maximize its tariff revenue and the trade value of imports to 
the EAC on these lines accounts for the targeted 17.9%. In this scenario, the Ugandan 
government would lose 11% of the revenue which it previously collected from tariffs on 
EU imports.
28 Only 781 of the lines selected for the EPA-UGA scenario overlap with 
lines selected for the EPA-EAC scenario. This divergence might indicate a large 
potential for disagreement between the EAC members in choosing sensitive products. 
The much higher loss in the EPA-EAC scenario confirms the conflict potential. The 
EPA-UGA and EPA-AG scenarios appear rather similar where the tariff loss in the latter 
is 12%. Finally, the EPA-FULL scenario liberalizes all imports on the EAC side as a 
counterfactual experiment.  
 
                                                 
28 For this analysis, we assume that tariff revenues on Ugandan imports under the EAC CET are recycled 
to the Ugandan government.   22
Table 4: Tariff line liberalization and revenue loss with respect to imports from the 
EU only 
 EPA-EAC EPA-UGA EPA-AG
No. tariff lines   3,965  2,542  2,542 
No. exempted   1,133  1,068  1,070 
Overlapping with EAC   1,133  781  802 
Uganda tariff revenue loss   -28.1%  -10.6%  -11.9% 
Source: Own computation from UNCTAD Trains for 2006. 
 
The aggregated scenarios are shown in Table 5. The tariffs listed are the average trade-
weighted tariffs for imports from the world, taking into account the eliminated tariff 
lines on EU imports in each scenario. From an initial EAC tariff of 7.07% the tariff drop 
for the three “realistic” EPA scenarios is around 1%, which is less than half of the 2.24% 
of a fully liberalized FTA with the EU. Apparently, Uganda is able to retain its 
protection to a large extent. The tariff differences in the Uganda-optimized and EAC-
optimized scenarios are only noteworthy in sectors where EU imports or imports in 
general play no important role. Therefore, we do not expect large shocks in any 
particular sectors.  
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Table 5: Import tariff shocks for simulation scenarios 
 EAC EPA-EAC EPA-UGA EPA-AG  EPA-FULL 
  % Percentage point change from EAC 
Coffee 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Other Cash Crops  9.50 -5.58 -4.73 -4.73  -6.58 
Maize 48.42 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18  -20.60 
Sorghum/Millet 24.98 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02  -7.18 
Cassava 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Sweet Potatoes  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Matooke 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Horticulture 23.82 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17  -9.75 
Other agriculture  0.12 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02  -0.04 
Livestock 10.99 -7.57 -0.76 -0.74  -7.77 
Forestry 0.89 -0.04 0.00 0.00  -0.07 
Fishing 12.21 -7.22 -0.15 -0.15  -10.65 
Meat and dairy processing 11.02 -4.90 -4.94 -4.89  -8.15 
Coffee processing  0.38 -0.33 -0.33 -0.33  -0.34 
Grain milling  5.58 -0.36 -0.36 -0.33  -1.47 
Other beverages  6.91 -2.74 -1.36 -1.29  -5.44 
Textiles and leather  18.65 -1.60 -1.55 -1.55  -2.24 
Manufacturing 9.11 -1.23 -1.03 -1.06  -3.06 
Fertilizers 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Petroleum and chemicals  2.69 -0.78 -0.66 -0.66  -0.93 
Utilities 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Construction 6.61 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Commerce 6.58 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Transport 6.54 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Private services  14.35 -3.29 -1.75 -1.75  -4.58 
Public services  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Weighted average  7.07 -1.04 -0.87 -0.88  -2.24 
Source: Own computation. EAC constitutes the base scenario to which all other scenarios are compared. 
Here, the CET has been implemented and all internal tariffs have been removed. EPA-EAC optimizes 
tariff revenues for the EAC as a whole, EPA-UGA the revenues for Uganda, EPA-AG prioritizes 
protection of the agricultural sector before maximizing Uganda’s revenues, and EPA-FULL depicts a full 
import liberalization between the EAC and the EU. All tariffs are computed from 2006 UNCTAD Trains 
database using trade weighting. All values are trade-weighted percentage ad valorem tariffs. 
 
 
4.3 CGE simulation results 
 
An inspection of the macro results in Table 6 indicates a similar tendency for all EPA 
scenarios. The effect on GDP is negligible. This outcome is largely grounded in the 
nature of the CGE model and the choice of closures. GDP at factor cost, computed as the 
sum of factor incomes, is largely predetermined through the assumption of fixed   24
employment levels and factor endowments. The small changes occurring are a result of 
changes in factor and consumer prices where the latter define the nummeraire. In 
addition, GDP at market prices, as presented in the table, can change through changes in 
indirect taxes. Both imports and exports increase with exports increasing more than 
twofold compared to imports. This is due to the assumption of a constant trade balance 
which fixes the relation of aggregate imports to exports together with the very large 
excess of imports over exports in the initial equilibrium. To facilitate larger exports, the 
economic structure shifts towards the export sectors. This shift is amplified by a 
depreciation of the exchange rate which balances the current account after the import 
tariff shock. Since factor endowments are fixed in this model, the main effects at the 
aggregate level are small allocative efficiency gains and the redistribution of initial 
income between the factors of production.  
 
Table 6: CGE simulation results: GDP composition, real exchange rate and factor 
returns 
 EAC  EPA-EAC EPA-UGA  EPA-AG  EPA-FULL
GDP components  Level  % change from EAC 
Private consumption  8782.52  0.02 0.01  0.01  0.02
Investments 1709.04  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00
Government 
consumption 
1122.32 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00
Exports 1171.25  1.24 0.82  0.82  2.06
Imports -2844.79  0.51 0.34  0.34  0.85
GDP 9940.34  0.01 0.01  0.01  0.02
Government income  1617.54 -0.29 -0.19  -0.19  -0.50
Real exchange rate  1.00 0.08 0.02  0.02  0.06
Sales tax rate   4.30 3.58  3.62  8.46
Factor real returns  % of total  % change from EAC level 
Labour unsk.  44.49  -0.25 -0.20  -0.20  -0.53
Labour sk.  9.28  -0.53 -0.34  -0.34  -0.89
Capital 23.60  -0.39 -0.29  -0.29  -0.76
Land 22.63  0.62 0.42  0.42  0.97
Source: Own computation. GDP component levels are in billion UGS of 2003. GDP is valued at market 
prices. 
 
Government consumption and investment are fixed in the model but the impact on 
private consumption is minimal as well. With the chosen government balance closure, 
government consumption is fixed and lost tariff revenue is compensated by adjustments   25




The factors capital and labour lose income in all scenarios with returns to unskilled 
labour decreasing less than those to skilled labour which in turn decrease less than 
returns to capital. Only returns to land benefit from the policy reforms with a relative 
increase higher than all of the decreases of the other factors. These changes in factor 
returns are partly explained by the structure of the SAM and partly by the chosen closure 
of perfect factor mobility. In the SAM, capital and skilled labour are primarily used by 
non-agricultural activities while land is only used by agricultural activities making these 
factors specific to those larger sectors. By contrast, unskilled labour is perfectly mobile 
across all sectors. Consequently, those specific factors gain and lose more sharply than 
unskilled labour which moves freely to adapt. In reality, it is likely that the market for 
unskilled labour is segmented to some degree, for example, between non-agricultural 
and agricultural sectors. This would create a wedge between the sectoral unskilled 
labour wages. In this case, it would be expected that some of the income gained by land 
is redistributed to agricultural unskilled labour while the real wage decreases in non-
agricultural sectors might additionally share some of the losses accruing to capital and 
skilled labour and thus might turn out larger.  
 
Like the aggregate changes, the sectoral changes of imports, exports, and domestic 
production exhibit similar tendencies in all EPA scenarios. Table 7 shows large relative 
impacts only for some rather minor import sectors. While imports increase slightly for 
all agricultural and manufacturing sectors apart from petroleum and chemicals they 
shrink somewhat for construction, commerce and trade. On the export side in Table 8, 
the most noteworthy increases are in coffee processing and manufacturing, two of the 
major export sectors. As presented in Table 9, domestic production reacts to the import 
liberalization by decreasing almost all production activities in the agricultural and 
manufacturing sectors. The single greatest beneficiaries are the coffee growing and 
processing sectors whose production increases between 1.3 and 3.0% depending on the 
EPA scenario. Moreover, utilities, construction, commerce, and transport benefit slightly 
from this development.  
 
                                                 
29 This is a percentage increase and not percentage point increase applied to each previously existing sales 
tax.   26
Table 7: CGE simulation results: import quantities 
 EAC EPA-EAC EPA-UGA EPA-AG  EPA-FULL
  % of total % change from EAC level 
Coffee 0.00 2.17 1.46 1.45  3.52
Other Cash Crops  0.00 13.59 11.34 11.34  15.60
Other agriculture  0.85 0.05 0.08 0.08  0.01
Livestock 0.10 19.99 2.08 2.06  20.92
Forestry 0.02 0.21 0.08 0.07  0.09
Fishing 0.01 18.13 0.20 0.20  28.24
Meat and dairy processing  1.84 3.80 3.89 3.85  6.51
Coffee processing  0.00 0.72 0.65 0.64  0.90
Grain milling  0.62 0.10 0.19 0.17  1.01
Other beverages  1.68 2.89 1.34 1.26  5.89
Textiles and leather  8.02 0.63 0.59 0.59  0.88
Manufacturing 47.40 0.19 0.17 0.18  0.52
Fertilizers 1.55 0.56 0.39 0.39  0.92
Petroleum and chemicals  24.60 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04  -0.19
Utilities 0.18 -0.73 -0.50 -0.50  -1.34
Construction 0.15 -0.76 -0.56 -0.57  -1.60
Commerce 0.63 -0.47 -0.32 -0.32  -0.86
Transport 6.16 -0.20 -0.13 -0.13  -0.34
Private services  6.18 3.33 1.68 1.68  4.50
Source: Own computation. Changes in import quantities. Rows with only zeros have been omitted. 
 
Table 8: CGE simulation results: export quantities 
 EAC EPA-EAC EPA-UGA EPA-AG  EPA-FULL 
  % of total % change from EAC level 
Maize 0.79 0.09 0.02 0.02  0.26 
Horticulture 1.09 0.17 0.06 0.06  0.38 
Other agriculture  2.06 0.07 0.00 0.00  0.23 
Fishing 3.65 0.28 0.24 0.24  0.52 
Coffee processing  41.00 1.88 1.28 1.27  3.04 
Other beverages  7.83 0.49 0.31 0.32  0.90 
Textiles and leather  0.44 0.30 -0.04 -0.04  0.67 
Manufacturing 14.82 1.25 0.75 0.75  1.99 
Utilities 2.04 1.31 0.87 0.88  2.39 
Transport 9.20 0.62 0.38 0.38  0.99 
Private services  17.06 0.85 0.59 0.59  1.58 
Source: Own computation. Changes in export quantities. Rows with only zeros have been omitted. 
   27
Table 9: CGE simulation results: domestic production activity 
 EAC EPA-EAC EPA-UGA EPA-AG  EPA-FULL
  % of total % change from EAC level 
Coffee 2.57 1.86 1.27 1.26  3.02
Other Cash Crops  1.30 -0.23 -0.18 -0.18  -0.39
Maize 1.95 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03  -0.09
Sorghum/Millet 2.37 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00
Cassava 1.82 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00
Sweet Potatoes  1.74 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00
Matooke 4.37 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03  -0.12
Horticulture 4.69 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.02
Other agriculture  3.74 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.02
Livestock 5.03 -0.25 -0.16 -0.15  -0.35
Forestry 1.35 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08  -0.19
Fishing 1.73 0.00 0.02 0.02  0.01
Meat and dairy processing  0.89 -1.81 -1.83 -1.82  -3.00
Coffee processing  3.14 1.86 1.27 1.26  3.02
Grain milling  0.59 -0.12 -0.10 -0.09  -0.40
Other beverages  8.45 -0.16 -0.10 -0.09  -0.32
Textiles and leather  1.02 -0.67 -0.76 -0.76  -0.86
Manufacturing 4.64 -0.05 -0.17 -0.19  -0.64
Petroleum and chemicals  0.69 -0.32 -0.24 -0.25  -0.28
Utilities 1.05 0.22 0.14 0.14  0.39
Construction 10.55 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.03
Commerce 10.59 0.08 0.04 0.04  0.11
Transport 7.56 0.15 0.09 0.09  0.23
Private services  12.51 -0.25 -0.10 -0.10  -0.28
Public services  5.68 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00
Source: Own computation. Changes in domestically produced quantities. Rows with only zeros have been 
omitted. 
 
Overall, the coffee sector appears to be the driver of the export growth. It experiences 
only a negligible negative import price shock and profits strongly from reduced import 
prices of its intermediate inputs as well as from cheaper unskilled labour which is 
released from the other agricultural and light manufacturing sectors. Since unskilled 
labour is released abundantly compared to land, the relatively land-intensive production 
of coffee drives up land returns. This effect is amplified by the depreciation of the 
exchange rate. The expansion in coffee exports simultaneously pushes expansion of the 
commerce and transport sectors. However, all observed allocational efficiency 
adjustments occur on a very low level.  
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4.4 Microsimulation results 
 
What are the consequences of the CGE results for poverty in Uganda? This question 
cannot be answered from the above results since price (Table 10) and factor income 
(Table 6) changes are partially counteracting and require quantification of their 
respective impacts on household income. In the CGE simulation results, returns to 
unskilled labour, but also to skilled labour and capital, fall but the prices for staples and 
grain milling products increase slightly while the prices for manufacturing tend to fall, 
making the impact on the poor population ambiguous. The only beneficiary factor is 
land, which is mainly owned by households in the richer deciles. The EPA scenarios 
appear to have a generally minor impact on the poverty headcount P0 of -0.06 to +/-0 
percentage points. The Uganda-optimized scenarios have a slightly smaller effect on the 
poverty headcount while leaving the gap and severity measures unchanged. By contrast, 
the EAC-optimized scenario leaves the headcount unchanged but worsens slightly the 
poverty gap and severity measures. The impacts differ for rural and urban areas. The 
poverty headcount improves for rural areas while it deteriorates for urban areas. The 
poverty gap and severity indicators deteriorate for both rural and urban areas.
30 Details 
not shown here reveal that in the three “realistic” EPA scenarios, between 0.04 and 
0.08% of the population fall into, while between 0.08 and 0.1% are lifted out of, 
poverty. Between 55 and 67% of the poor population experience a widening of their 
individual poverty gaps. The agricultural protection-prioritizing scenario EPA-AG 
shows no difference to the outcomes of the EPA-UGA scenario. The Gini index 
indicates a worsening of income inequality. The changes in mean real incomes by decile 
are biased against the poor as loss of average income in the lower deciles turns to gains 
for the richer deciles. This reflects the higher income shares of the richer deciles spent 
on manufactures and services for which prices have decreased more strongly than for 
basic foods and also the higher prevalence of land ownership, the only factor which 
gains.  
 
                                                 
30 We underline again that the poverty effects modeled here take the changes in the factor returns of each 
individual household’s endowments and the changes in prices of its specific consumption bundle into 
account. But the model disregards changes in unemployment and employment structure and the adaptive 
behavior of individuals.   29
Table 10: CGE simulation results: consumer price changes 
 EPA-EAC EPA-UGA EPA-AG EPA-FULL 
  % change from EAC level 
Coffee 0.17 0.08 0.08 0.22 
Other Cash Crops  -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.21 
Maize 0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.04 
Sorghum/Millet 0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.03 
Cassava 0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.03 
Sweet Potatoes  0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
Matooke 0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.02 
Horticulture 0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.02 
Other agriculture  0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.02 
Livestock 0.21 0.15 0.15 0.29 
Forestry 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.02 
Fishing -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.11 
Meat and dairy processing -1.36 -1.39 -1.37 -2.37 
Coffee processing  -0.31 -0.25 -0.25 -0.55 
Grain milling  0.05 0.03 0.03 -0.07 
Other beverages  0.37 0.35 0.35 0.65 
Textiles and leather  -0.82 -0.82 -0.82 -1.20 
Manufacturing -0.82 -0.70 -0.72 -2.08 
Fertilizers 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 
Petroleum and chemicals  1.05 0.83 0.84 2.46 
Utilities -0.23 -0.16 -0.16 -0.47 
Construction -0.41 -0.33 -0.34 -0.96 
Commerce -0.19 -0.14 -0.14 -0.39 
Transport -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 
Private services  -0.69 -0.42 -0.42 -1.12 
Public services  -0.30 -0.21 -0.21 -0.55 
Source: Own computation. Changes in domestic consumer prices. 
   30
Table 11: Microsimulation results 
 EAC EPA-EAC EPA-UGA EPA-AG  EPA-FULL 
Poverty, national    
P0  37.28 37.28 37.22 37.22 37.22 
P1 11.62 11.65 11.62 11.62  11.66 
P2 5.06 5.09 5.06 5.06  5.10 
Poverty, rural    
P0 41.34 41.32 41.26 41.26  41.26 
P1 12.93 12.97 12.93 12.93  12.98 
P2 5.64 5.67 5.65 5.65  5.68 
Poverty, urban    
P0 11.81 11.91 11.86 11.86  11.90 
P1 3.36 3.38 3.37 3.37  3.39 
P2 1.39 1.41 1.40 1.40  1.41 
Gini  50.38 50.46 50.43 50.43 50.49 
Real income    
Decile  Mean income % change from EAC 
1.00 82807.60 -0.35 -0.16 -0.16  -0.52 
2.00 125303.23 -0.22 -0.06 -0.06  -0.30 
3.00 156268.52 -0.10 0.02 0.02  -0.09 
4.00 186667.56 0.01 0.12 0.12  0.10 
5.00 221051.59 0.08 0.17 0.17  0.22 
6.00 262778.56 0.12 0.19 0.19  0.29 
7.00 315409.83 0.24 0.30 0.30  0.50 
8.00 402777.47 0.23 0.28 0.28  0.48 
9.00 574612.84 0.28 0.30 0.30  0.53 
10.00 1729785.34 0.28 0.28 0.28  0.51 
Source: Own computation. The poverty figures use rural and urban poverty lines, respectively. Totals are 




In this chapter we examine the poverty impacts of an EPA agreement between Uganda 
and the EU and specifically its trade provisions. It focuses particularly on the 
implications of the required reduction in EAC tariffs as part of the implementation of a 
reciprocal free trade area. The qualitative analysis of the data derived from the Uganda 
National Household Survey (UNHS) 2002/2003 confirms that Uganda is an agriculture-
based economy with most people living in rural areas and being dependent on 
agriculture. In particular, there is a high incidence of subsistence farming and a strong 
dependency of the poorest people on income from unskilled labour and, to a lesser 
extent, from transfers and land. They spend the largest part of their incomes on food but 
also a significant share on non-food manufactures.    31
 
The analysis of the impact potential of an EPA with the EU first of all highlights the 
relatively low share the EU has in Ugandan imports and the low average tariff of 5.5% 
the EU currently faces for those exports. 18.9% of Ugandan imports come from the EU 
which is similar to the 16.7% Uganda imports from the internal EAC market. Also, EU 
imports appear to be complementary to Uganda’s domestic production rather than 
competing. The EPA impact is quantified using a single country CGE model for 
Uganda. Starting from the EAC’s common external tariff and its free trade area, all EPA 
scenarios show negligible effects on GDP and a small increase in trade activity with 
exports increasing more strongly than imports in relative terms. The small magnitude of 
aggregate effects is inherent in the chosen static long-run model which is characterized 
by fixed factor endowments, a fixed trade balance, and perfectly mobile production 
factors.  
 
Turning to the sectoral level, the impacts on all sectors are rather small. On the export 
side, the coffee processing sector as the largest export sector stands out with gains 
between 1.3 and 1.9% in exports for the three “realistic” EPA scenarios but also 
manufacturing expands by 0.8 to 1.3%. The coffee sector benefits from the slight 
depreciation of the exchange rate, reduced prices of imported intermediate inputs, as 
well as the negative price shocks on the other agricultural sectors, which cause wages 
for unskilled labour to fall. During this process, the shrinking agricultural sectors release 
more unskilled labour relative to land than required by the expanding highly land-
intensive coffee growing sector causing unskilled labour wages to decrease and land 
rents to increase.  
 
A subsequent microsimulation projecting the CGE results onto the UNHS 2002/03 
quantifies the ensuing poverty effects. Both the development of factor returns and price 
patterns are adverse for the poor so that the poorest two deciles face a small decrease in 
their average real incomes whereas the richer deciles gain. On the national level we find 
very small poverty effects amounting to between -0.06 and zero percentage points 
change in the poverty headcount depending on whether Uganda is able to secure its 
preferred tariff exemptions in the EAC negotiations or not. This also decides whether the 
poverty gap remains constant or increases. In all scenarios, the poverty headcount is 
falling for the rural but rising for the urban population. The poverty severity tends to 
increase everywhere and the Gini index to worsen slightly in all scenarios. However, it   32
should be born in mind that the microsimulation does not allow for adaptive behavior of 
the households and thus overestimates the negative effects. We should also recall that 
the changes modelled here will in practice be implemented over a 25 year period in 
which the structure of the Ugandan economy will no doubt change radically. 
 
In general, the CGE model results have to be interpreted in the light of the model’s 
structure and assumptions. They show the economic pressures arising from adjustment 
towards an efficient allocation of resources as a result of the simulated shock. Our model 
ignores limiting factors like, for example, limited adjustment capacities of farmers and 
other supply-side constraints. The model could also be further developed to better reflect 
the realities of the labour market in Uganda, to improve on the naïve assumptions of full 
employment and perfect labour mobility, and to better capture the implications of trade 
diversion by disaggregating imports from different sources. Moreover, it does not model 
qualitative development. The model only allows more production of what is produced 
already but it does not allow for new products, technical change, quality improvements, 
and so forth. The same applies for trade. No trade will arise for products which the 
country did not trade before. Indeed, qualitative development is likely to play an 
important role in Uganda’s response to the opportunities created by the EPA, for 
example, if foreign investment takes advantage of the more credible policy environment.  
 
However, we believe that these caveats are unlikely to change the conclusion of the 
analysis that the EPA agreement with the EU will have only a minor impact on the 
Ugandan economy and Uganda’s poor population. Such impacts will be additionally 
diminished given the long 25 year transition period agreed. Importantly, the analysis 
shows that such an agreement does not induce large deindustrialization effects and that 
the economic adjustment costs for Uganda and the poor population are quite low. 
Nevertheless, whether the small poverty effects are positive or not depends on the choice 
of the tariff lines for exemption from liberalization, although under all scenarios the 
ultra-poor appear to lose.  
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